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Why Is Everyone Talking 
About ACOs?
Many health care providers, policy-
makers, and analysts complain about 
the incentives inherent in the current 
fee-for-service payment approach, 
which rewards providers financially 
for prescribing as many services as 
possible while driving up health care 
costs for patients. For many, the holy 
grail of health policy-making has been 
to find a model that aligns health care 
providers’ and patients’ interests. In 
the 1980s and ’90s, some thought 
that health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs) might be such a model, but 
patients, encouraged by their physi-
cians, eventually objected to HMOs’ 
perceived intrusion into patient care 
decisions, causing HMOs to back off 
from some of their earlier approaches 
and to now fade from prominence. 
Two decades later, the next great hope 
of many has become accountable 
care organizations (ACOs). Although 
known primarily as a Medicare 
program authorized in the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA), ACO-style payment 
arrangements have already been ad-
opted by private insurers, even before 
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS) issued its final regula-
tions for the program on October 20, 
2011.1  CMS’ final regulations for the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program 
(MSSP), as it is called, respond to 
many concerns raised by providers 
in response to the agency’s proposed 
regulations published in March 2011.2  
At the time, many providers that were 
preparing to become ACOs were 
dismayed when CMS chose to lay out 
a program that was more stringent and 
less generous than CMS’ ACO precur-
sor experiment, called the Physician 
Group Practice Demonstration (PGP 
demo), which ran from April 2005 
through March 2010.3  Shortly after 
the release of CMS’ proposed rules, 
many prominent health care systems 
announced that they would not partici-
pate in the program being proposed.4  
(For more details, see “CMS Responds 
to Provider Concerns about the Medi-
care Shared Savings Program” later in 
this paper.)
Having received more than 1,300 
comment letters, some with stinging 
criticism of its proposed regulations, 
CMS regrouped and made numerous 
changes in response. Some provider 
groups and their advisors lauded CMS 
for “br[inging] ACOs back to life.”5  
With the revised regulation, prospects 
have increased for a broad test of the 
ACO concept in Medicare—and with 
other payers as well.
ACOs consist of networks of pro-
viders that are rewarded financially 
if they can slow the growth in their 
patients’ health care spending while 
maintaining or improving the quality 
of the care they deliver. An impor-
tant difference between HMOs and 
ACOs is that providers themselves, 
rather than an often distant insurance 
company, control the diagnosis and 
treatment decisions, but exercise this 
control under new payment incentives 
that encourage greater prudence in the 
use of health services. Furthermore, as 
with current fee-for-service systems 
of care, patients retain the freedom 
to seek additional services from any 
clinician or facility at any time. And to 
prevent providers from inappropriately 
limiting patients’ access to services 
in order to save money, the ACO is 
monitored through its performance on 
a suite of quality measures designed 
to ensure that it is providing recom-
mended services and high-quality 
care. Performance on these measures 
also determines providers’ financial 
bonuses. (“What Makes the ACO 
Concept New?” below describes other 
features of ACOs.) 
This paper provides an overview of 
ACOs, their origins, and the cur-
rent status of adoption of this model 
by both Medicare and private health 
insurance plans.
When the ACA established the MSSP, 
ACOs made the leap from being a 
conceptual idea6  tested in only one 
demonstration7  to forming the basis 
of a national effort poised to transform 
the way care is delivered.8  Beginning 
in January 2012, CMS will begin ac-
cepting applications from providers 
that are interested in forming ACOs 
and working to lower their patients’ 
health spending enough to earn annual 
bonus payments. 
Since Medicare is the largest health 
plan in the United States, this new 
approach is likely to affect how other 
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health plans pay providers. Already, 
many private health insurance plans 
have entered into contracts with 
groups of health care providers to 
serve as ACOs for their plans’ private-
ly insured enrollees.9  Some HMOs, 
especially those in California, have 
been way ahead of fee-for-service 
Medicare in delegating traditional 
insurance company functions to pro-
vider organizations, and doing so by 
providing financial rewards for more 
prudent spending and penalties for 
overspending. But Medicare’s ACO 
approach may influence many more 
health plans because it provides a 
model for an intermediary form of de-
livery: putting providers in a position 
somewhere between being paid solely 
through volume-increasing fee-for-
service payments and operating within 
tightly managed, prospectively defined 
capitated budgets that place providers 
at full financial risk for all spending 
for their enrolled populations. 
CMS’ new Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Innovation, which was also 
created by the ACA, is testing alterna-
tive ACO models in addition to the 
MSSP.10  In May 2011, the Innovation 
Center announced that it will test a 
new “Pioneer ACO” model, targeted to 
organizations that already have a track 
record of managing financial risk and 
developing systems for being account-
able for quality-related performance. 
Providers interested in being Pioneer 
ACOs submitted proposals in August, 
which the Innovation Center has now 
reviewed; announcements of which 
applicants will be selected for this 
experiment are expected shortly. This 
demonstration program will allow 
ACOs to earn higher shared savings 
bonus payments than under the MSSP, 
but will also put them at risk of paying 
back higher amounts to CMS if they 
increase spending above projections. 
And in the third and final year of the 
Pioneer ACO experiment, ACOs that 
meet a specified level of savings will 
be eligible to move a substantial por-
tion of their payments to a population-
based model in which they would 
receive a dollar amount per beneficiary 
per month—true capitation—instead 
of continuing to layer ACO bonus 
payments on top of traditional fee-for-
service reimbursement.11 
The Innovation Center will also allow 
some ACOs participating in the MSSP, 
including small physician practices 
and rural community hospitals, to 
take out loans from CMS to pay for 
infrastructure investments, such as 
purchasing electronic health records 
and hiring nurse care managers.12  
These loans would be deducted from 
any future shared savings payments 
the ACO might qualify for from CMS. 
The Innovation Center is also trying to 
encourage the development of ACOs 
through free conferences for execu-
tives on core ACO competencies, such 
as improving care delivery, effectively 
using health information technology 
and data, and building capacity to as-
sume and manage financial risk.13 
Where Did the ACO 
Concept Come From? 
The ACO model has several anteced-
ents. In 2000, Congress passed a law 
directing CMS to test a model now 
widely considered to be the ACO mod-
el when it authorized the PGP demo.14  
Participating physician groups in the 
demo were eligible to keep a por-
tion of the savings they generated 
for Medicare, relative to a projected 
spending target, and could increase 
their share of savings depending on 
how well they improved performance 
on a set of 32 quality measures. This 
demonstration ran from April 2005 
through March 2010, and involved 
nine multispecialty group practices 
and one physician-hospital organiza-
tion. (For more on this demo, see 
“Will ACOs Save Money?”.)15  
The ACO concept also bears resem-
blance to “provider-sponsored organi-
zations” (PSOs) established in Medi-
care in the Balanced Budget Act of 
1997. In both PSOs and ACOs, CMS 
contracts directly with providers, not 
insurers, to take financial responsibil-
ity for their patients’ health care and 
essentially function as a health plan. 
However, to date, only three PSOs 
have ever been created.16  ACOs may 
be less intimidating to set up than 
PSOs because they do not require 
providers to immediately abandon fee-
for-service reimbursement for fully 
capitated payments and do not restrict 
patient choice, and so are less likely 
to involve the complex insurance-like 
regulations that contributed to the lack 
of provider interest in the PSO option.
Dartmouth researcher Elliott Fisher 
deserves credit for stimulating broad 
policy interest in the ACO approach by 
introducing the concept of an “extend-
ed hospital medical staff” at a 2006 
meeting of the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission (MedPAC).17  
Fisher presented findings showing that 
Medicare beneficiaries received most 
of their care from relatively stable 
sets of local physicians and hospitals; 
he argued that these providers could 
be grouped together to form “virtual 
organizations” that could be held ac-
countable for the cost and quality of 
the full continuum of care delivered to 
these patients. In the course of discus-
sion, MedPAC Chair Glenn Hack-
barth referred to Fisher’s model as an 
“accountable organization.” Fisher 
apparently liked the term; he adopted 
it when he published his proposed “ac-
countable care organization” model in 
Health Affairs shortly thereafter.18  His 
and others’ ACO models have since 
evolved to require actual organiza-
tions, rather than virtual organizations, 
but the term has stuck.
What Makes the ACO 
Concept New?
Although private health insurers are 
now pursuing ACO contracts with 
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providers, the term ACO was initially 
developed in the context of Medicare. 
The new MSSP explicitly relies on 
ACOs, which CMS has defined as 
organizations of providers that ac-
cept accountability for a population of 
Medicare beneficiaries, coordinate all 
of the services received across the care 
continuum, and encourage investment 
in infrastructure and redesigned care 
processes for high-quality and efficient 
service delivery. Yet this operational 
definition does not emphasize what 
makes ACOs different from well-
established provider organizations 
that private health insurance plans 
(including Medicare Advantage plans) 
regularly contract with, including mul-
tispecialty group practices and inde-
pendent practice associations (IPAs), 
using prospective, per-capita payments 
rather than fee-for-service reimburse-
ment. 
The three major characteristics that 
differentiate ACOs from existing 
health plan and provider arrangements 
in various parts of the country —
whether they are operating under con-
tracts with private health insurers and/
or public payers like Medicare—are 
the presence of the following central 
features: 
1. Shared Savings. In current ACO 
arrangements, providers generally 
receive bonuses if their patients’ 
health care costs are below a pro-
jected amount based on their own 
historic spending, regardless of 
whether the level of their historic 
spending is high or low. The size 
of these bonuses depends, in part, 
on how much savings the ACO 
produces. Both the MSSP and 
private ACO contracts have been 
layering these bonus payments on 
top of traditional fee-for-service 
reimbursement, rather than mak-
ing the leap to capitation (pre-paid 
fees paid per patient, see glossary 
for complete definition).
2. Accountability for Quality. The 
ACO’s performance on numerous 
quality metrics is also central to 
determining whether the ACO is 
eligible for shared savings and, if 
so, the amount of shared savings 
it receives from the sponsoring 
payer.
3. Free Choice of Providers by 
Patients. Patients assigned to an 
ACO are still free to continue to 
seek care from any other provider 
that accepts their insurance. In 
short, there is no enrollment and 
patients are not “locked in” to see-
ing particular providers within a 
designated provider network.
Do ACOs Exist in the 
Private Sector?
Although CMS has only recently is-
sued final regulations laying out its 
ACO program for Medicare, private 
health insurers have already begun to 
enter into ACO contracts with provider 
groups.19  These private ACO contracts 
are giving patients added incentives to 
seek care within their plan’s provider 
network, such as by offering reduced 
premiums for individuals who receive 
care from providers taking part in such 
arrangements.20  By contrast, Medicare 
has so far chosen not to offer such 
financial incentives to Medicare ben-
eficiaries to stay within their ACO’s 
provider network. 
At least eight private health insurance 
plans have entered into ACO contracts 
with providers using a shared risk pay-
ment model, making providers eligible 
for both bonuses and financial penal-
ties.21  Many more (27, by one count) 
have entered into shared savings con-
tracts, which make providers eligible 
for bonuses, but do not put them at 
financial risk if they exceed spending 
Fee-for-service – When health insurance plans or payers pay providers a fee for each service performed. 
Capitation – A specific per-capita dollar amount paid per patient per month (or per year) to providers, in return for providing what-
ever quantity of services is needed to meet the health needs of a defined patient population.
Partial capitation – The combination of payment of a preset, prepaid capitated amount and payment based on actual use of ser-
vices. The term also has been used to characterize two other payment models, which may cause some confusion: (1) providers can 
accept full financial risk on a limited set of services (i.e., professional services but not institutional services), or (2) providers can 
accept partial financial risk for all services. 
Shared savings – When at least part of a provider’s income is dependent on the financial performance of a larger organization 
(such as a provider organization or a health insurance plan), and the larger entity generates fewer costs than projected in a given 
time period, providers share in some of these savings. This is also known as “one-sided risk,” although providers actually risk 
nothing financially. 
Shared risk – When financial liabilities are shared among entities. For example, in the MSSP, if an ACO’s patients’ health care 
spending is higher than a projected spending amount, the ACO agrees to pay back CMS for a portion of those excess costs. This is 
also known as “two-sided risk,” since providers are both eligible for bonuses and liable for penalties. 
Source: Adapted from Delaware Healthcare Association, “Delaware Healthcare Association Glossary of Health Care Terms and Acronyms,” 
(www.deha.org/Glossary/GlossaryS.htm#Top).
Glossary: Provider Payment Approaches
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targets.22  (See glossary for a descrip-
tion of these and other key terms.)
The private ACO contracts that have 
been identified so far use shared sav-
ings, shared risk, or partial capitation; 
none have moved all the way to full 
capitation yet.23  Meanwhile, CMS is 
experimenting with all three payment 
approaches. Its MSSP offers two pay-
ment options to ACOs: a shared sav-
ings (bonus-only) model and a shared 
risk model. CMS’ Pioneer ACO model 
starts off as a shared risk model and 
transitions to a true partial capitation 
model in the third year. 
The private ACO contracts using 
shared risk include several Blue Cross 
Blue Shield plans in different states 
(e.g., Illinois, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, North Carolina), Aetna, and 
Anthem/WellPoint. Some of these 
insurance companies have taken the 
unusual step of entering into five-year 
contracts with their ACO providers; 
most other insurers are using shorter 
periods. Several private ACO contracts 
are offering providers 50 percent of 
the savings they generate (the same 
level of savings offered in the bonus-
only option of the MSSP), and intend 
to transition their private ACO con-
tracts to some form of capitation in 
coming years, as in the Pioneer ACO 
model being pursued by CMS’ Innova-
tion Center. 
Some health plan representatives 
and providers question whether full 
capitation is compatible with the ACO 
philosophy of allowing patients easy 
access to providers outside of their 
provider network; they suggest that 
full capitation may put providers at 
too much financial risk with too little 
control over where patients seek care. 
In addition, ACOs’ relative lack of 
control over patient choices may make 
partial capitation more appealing.
Although health care organizations are 
only beginning to enter into contracts 
with private insurers to act as ACOs, 
dozens of major health systems and 
provider groups have joined learn-
ing collaboratives convened by the 
Premier healthcare alliance and by the 
Brookings Institution and Dartmouth 
College to explore what it might take 
to become an ACO.24  In addition, 
the National Committee for Quality 
Assurance has issued proposed ACO 
capabilities, which will form the basis 
of a voluntary ACO accreditation pro-
gram in the fall of 2011.25 
Will ACOs Save Money?
The results of the only demonstration 
that directly tested the ACO concept—
CMS’ PGP demo—suggest that ACOs 
will be able to improve the quality of 
care they deliver (at least as measured 
by process-oriented clinical quality 
measures), but will have a harder time 
generating savings.26 
Source: RTI International, “Physician Group Practice Demonstration: Performance Year 1 - Preliminary Performance Year 5 Summary Results,” 
(www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/PGP_Summary_Results.pdf).
Shared Savings Earned in the PGP Demo (an ACO Precursor)
(in millions of dollars)
$0 $5 $10 $15 $20 $25 $30 $35 $40 $45
Billings Clinic (MT/WY)
Forsyth Medical Group (NC)
Middlesex Health System (CT)
Everett Clinic (WA)
Geisinger Clinic (PA)
Park Nicollet Clinic (MN)
Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic (NH/VT)
St. John's Clinic (AR)
University of Michigan (MI)
Marshfield Clinic (WI)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues     5
The PGP demo’s independent evalu-
ator has called the savings from the 
program “small.”27  How small? As 
shown in the previous table, annual 
shared savings payments to the large 
medical groups participating in the 
demo averaged $5.4 million (among 
the participants who earned any bonus 
at all), and ranged from a few hundred 
thousand dollars to $16 million for the 
demo’s biggest winner, the Marshfield 
Clinic. Only two participants lowered 
health spending enough to receive bo-
nuses in all five years of the demo, and 
three of the 10 participants received no 
bonus in any year of the demo. 
Another analysis estimated that if new 
ACOs in the MSSP end up making 
the same average initial investment 
that PGP demo participants did—$1.7 
million in their first year—they will 
need to turn a 20 percent profit to 
break even over their first three-year 
ACO contract with Medicare. Given 
how unrealistic 20 percent operating 
margins are, these analysts concluded 
that most organizations will lose 
money in the first three years under the 
ACO model.28  Of course, just because 
ACOs may not turn a profit during 
their initial three-year contract with 
Medicare does not mean they would 
fail to turn a profit during subsequent 
three-year ACO contracts under the 
MSSP. 
In addition to producing meager sav-
ings for participating providers, Medi-
care also accrued relatively modest 
savings from the PGP demo. On net, 
the demonstration—which covered 
220,000 Medicare beneficiaries in a 
select group of large group practices 
judged by CMS as having the neces-
sary experience, infrastructure, and 
financial strength to succeed29 —saved 
the Medicare program only $26.6 
million30,  or approximately $121 per 
beneficiary over five years. Even more 
disappointing, CMS’ independent 
evaluator questioned whether demo 
participants generated savings by actu-
ally reducing spending or by merely 
raising the spending targets they had 
to work within by more thoroughly 
recording patients’ diagnoses. (Under 
the risk-adjustment model CMS uses, 
spending and spending targets are 
adjusted based on patients’ diagnoses.) 
CMS’ evaluator noted in the second-
year evaluation that if the illness 
severity of demo participants’ patient 
panels had increased at the same rate 
as other providers in the same geo-
graphic areas, only one participant 
would have qualified for a bonus pay-
ment, instead of four.31 
The bottom line is that the PGP demo 
does not seem to have succeeded 
in meaningfully reducing spending 
growth. However, it should not be 
surprising that the demo did not cause 
providers to dramatically alter the way 
they deliver care to achieve large re-
ductions in health care spending. After 
all, the current fee-for-service payment 
system penalizes providers for doing 
what was asked in this demo: namely, 
to reduce the volume of services 
providers deliver through better care 
coordination and greater attention to 
evidence of what actually benefits pa-
tients. Given the initial three-year limit 
on CMS’ commitment to the payment 
approach used in this demo, it might 
have been foolhardy for participants to 
overhaul their business model, includ-
ing reducing their revenues from hos-
pital admissions, for a temporary pilot 
being offered by only one payer—
even one as important as Medicare.32  
In contrast, although MSSP contracts 
will initially extend only three to four 
years, ACOs that meet performance 
standards will be able to renew these 
contracts, since this is now a fully 
operational, permanent program, not a 
one-time demonstration. 
The PGP demo has also been criti-
cized for not including strong enough 
financial incentives to change pro-
vider behavior. Some policy analysts 
and MedPAC have argued that a way 
to strengthen incentives is to offer 
providers the option of taking on 
financial risk, giving them a more 
compelling business case for chang-
ing the way they deliver care.33  CMS 
is now implementing several payment 
approaches—including offering either 
shared savings (bonus-only) or shared 
risk in the MSSP, and shared risk with 
a transition to partial capitation in the 
Pioneer ACO demonstration—which 
should eventually permit an assess-
ment of which payment models are 
best able to achieve the desired reori-
entation of clinical practice to improve 
value for patients and taxpayers.
Will ACOs Improve Health 
Care Quality for Patients? 
A primary objective of the MSSP is to 
improve the quality of care that pro-
viders deliver, and evidence from the 
PGP demo suggests ACOs will be able 
to do this. The 10 physician organiza-
tions in the demo were able to meet 
performance benchmarks for the vast 
majority of the quality measures they 
were held to, which grew from 10 dia-
betes measures in the first year to 32 
measures covering diabetes, coronary 
artery disease, congestive heart failure, 
hypertension, and cancer screening by 
the fifth year of the demo. 
The underlying mechanism driving 
improvements in care quality in ACOs 
is the financial bonuses that ACOs can 
receive if they meet quality and cost 
benchmarks. This in turn gives provid-
ers an incentive to coordinate their 
patients’ care to reduce duplication of 
services, invest in infrastructure like 
health information technology, rede-
sign care processes, and practice with 
greater adherence to clinical evidence 
of what treatments work best.34  Taken 
together, these activities may no-
ticeably improve the quality of care 
received by Medicare beneficiaries—
and private insurers’ ACO efforts have 
a similar potential to enhance care for 
their patients.
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CMS’ proposed rule for the MSSP aroused many concerns 
among would-be ACOs.1  Here’s a look at some of provid-
ers’ key complaints, and how CMS addressed them in its final 
regulations:
Downside risk. The proposed rule would have required ACOs 
to pay CMS back for a share of their overspending if they ex-
ceeded their spending targets (beginning in either in year one or 
three, depending on which of two payment tracks they chose). 
Some argued that the ACA did not intend for all Medicare 
ACOs to be required to bear such financial risk and that the re-
quirement would narrow the pool of potential MSSP applicants. 
In the final rule, CMS gives ACOs the option of a bonus-only 
payment track for their first Medicare ACO contract, although 
a risk-sharing option is also still offered as an alternative pay-
ment track. Subsequent three-year Medicare ACO contracts will 
require all ACOs to take on financial risk.
Not enough upside. If spending for an ACO’s assigned patients 
is less than what Medicare would have otherwise spent, ACOs 
get to keep a share of these savings. But in CMS’ proposed rule, 
ACOs would have only been allowed to keep 52.5 percent or 65 
percent of these savings, depending on which of the two pay-
ment tracks they selected, compared to 80 percent in the PGP 
demo.2  Providers saw this share of savings as not high enough 
to justify the substantial upfront investments needed to set up 
an ACO and the requirement that they take on financial risk. 
The total savings an ACO could earn was capped at 7.5 percent 
or 10 percent of their Medicare spending, respectively. Further, 
ACOs in the bonus-only payment track could only keep a share 
of their savings that exceeded a “minimum savings rate,” set at 
2 percent to 3.9 percent of their spending target, depending on 
the size of the ACO’s patient panel. Meanwhile, ACOs in the 
other payment track would have to pass a minimum savings rate 
threshold of 2 percent before they would be eligible for savings 
or losses, but could then keep their share of all savings earned—
not just the savings above their minimum savings rate (called 
“first-dollar” sharing). The purpose of having a minimum sav-
ings rate is to protect CMS from paying bonuses to ACOs for 
random, statistical fluctuations in their year-to-year spending 
levels that might have occurred unrelated to their own activi-
ties. Many providers thought the combination of financial risk, 
minimum savings rates, caps on upside potential savings, and 
the sharing percentage provided too little potential gains for the 
financial commitments involved with participation.
CMS’ final rule maintains the minimum savings rate thresholds, 
but now allows ACOs in both payment tracks to retain “first-
dollar” savings once their minimum savings rate is met. CMS 
has also raised the cap on the total savings an ACO can earn, 
to 10 percent or 15 percent of their overall spending target, but 
marginally lowered the share of savings that ACOs can keep to 
50 percent or 60 percent (depending on which of the two pay-
ment tracks the ACO selects).
All-or-nothing quality thresholds for payment, and too 
many quality measures. CMS had initially proposed assessing 
ACOs on 65 quality measures, some of which were composite 
measures made up of several measures. Relatively few of these 
measures would have been generated using already-submitted 
claims data; others would have required ACOs to collect new 
data, often through labor-intensive chart review. Performance 
on these measures would be used to calculate the size of ACOs’ 
shared savings bonus payments, using an all-or-nothing ap-
proach: if for any single quality measure, an ACO didn’t meet 
the minimum performance level (i.e., performing at the 30th 
percentile or doing something 30 percent of the time, depend-
ing on the measure), they would be ineligible for any bonus 
payments. 
In the final rule, CMS cut the number of quality measures it 
will use in half, to only 33—but many of these measures will 
still require ACOs to collect new data through medical record 
review. Also, the approach for determining if ACOs qualify for 
bonus payments has been relaxed: ACOs can now earn bonus 
payments if they meet minimum performance targets for 70 per-
cent of the quality measures in each of four domains—a more 
achievable goal.
Retrospective assignment of patients. To determine which 
patients an ACO should be held accountable for, CMS proposed 
identifying beneficiaries that received primary care services 
from an ACO’s primary care physicians at the end of the year, 
after care had been delivered. But providers prefer to know who 
they are responsible for at the beginning of the year, to clarify 
both ACOs’ and patients’ roles and responsibilities. To facilitate 
this, CMS would have given providers lists at the beginning of 
their three-year ACO contracts naming the beneficiaries they 
were likely to be held accountable for, based on which providers 
these patients had received primary care from in the past.
CMS has stuck with its approach of prospectively identifying 
beneficiaries that an ACO is likely to be held accountable for, 
and then retrospectively assigning them at the end of the year 
to assess ACOs’ actual performance—but it is now calling this 
approach “preliminary prospective assignment.” CMS has 
made an important change in committing to increase how often 
it gives ACOs lists of patients they are likely to be held account-
able for; that will now be done quarterly, instead of once at the 
beginning of the ACO’s contract. 
Not counting specialists’ patients in ACOs. To emphasize 
the crucial role of primary care to the ACO concept, CMS 
had proposed counting only primary care physicians’ patients, 
not specialists’, when determining which patients an ACO is 
responsible for—even if a specialist provides the plurality of 
visits a beneficiary receives. This would have prevented the 
sickest, most expensive patients from benefiting from ACOs’ 
enhanced care coordination, since patients with chronic condi-
tions are often cared for by specialists.3  
CMS Responds to Provider Concerns About the Medicare Shared Savings Program
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More explicit ACO requirements that 
could lead to improved quality of 
care include CMS’ decision to have 
ACOs submit written plans explain-
ing how they will promote beneficiary 
engagement, coordinate care, promote 
evidence-based medicine, and mea-
sure quality. ACOs will also have to 
include a Medicare beneficiary on 
their governing board or provide an 
alternative means of assuring mean-
ingful opportunity for beneficiaries to 
participate in ACO governance. 
Although ACOs have great potential 
to benefit patients through improved 
care quality and patient-centeredness, 
the ACO model’s incentive to lower 
health care spending could lead 
providers to stint on needed care to 
save money. However, the backlash 
against HMOs in the 1990s appears 
to be causing both public and pri-
vate plans to build in protections and 
mechanisms to prevent stinting—not 
only because withholding needed care 
is ethically wrong, but because ACOs 
could fail if patients do not perceive 
direct benefits of participating in the 
program. Health economist Stuart 
Altman has noted that “[t]he great 
managed care environment of the 
1990s fell apart to a large extent over 
the fact that the consumer, the patient, 
felt used.”35   To ensure that ACOs do 
not inappropriately avoid beneficiaries 
likely to need a lot of services, CMS 
will monitor ACOs and end their par-
ticipation in the program if they avoid 
at-risk beneficiaries who are likely to 
generate high costs.
Will Quality Measures 
Protect Patients Against 
Harm?
ACO proponents think that publicly 
available quality measures can go a 
long way towards protecting patients 
against the kind of stinting on care that 
patients perceived HMOs as engaging 
in during the 1990s. 
In the MSSP, CMS will monitor ACOs 
through their reporting on 33 quality 
measures. ACOs that do not perform at 
the 30th percentile or percent (de-
pending on the measure) on at least 
70 percent of the measures in each of 
four domains would not be eligible 
to share in any savings they generate, 
and would have one year to improve 
performance before being terminated 
from the program. ACOs would be 
eligible for higher shares of savings if 
they perform at higher percentiles on 
these measures. 
The measure set proposed by CMS 
includes clinical process and patient 
experience-of-care measures, with a 
few outcome measures. These mea-
sures fall into four domains: patient/
caregiver experience, care coordina-
tion/patient safety, preventive health, 
and at-risk population measures. There 
are no efficiency or resource use mea-
sures, presumably because the pay-
ment model itself provides incentives 
for ACOs to be cost-conscious. 
It is unclear whether quality measures 
currently are up to one of the tasks 
assigned them, that is, to ensure that 
cost savings will not be achieved by 
CMS will now allow some specialists’ patients to be included 
in ACOs, if they are receiving primary care services exclusively 
from them and not a primary care physician—meaning patients 
making many visits to specialists and a single one to a primary 
care physician will be assigned based on that single visit. CMS 
will also count patients who receive primary care services 
exclusively from physician assistants, nurse practitioners, and 
clinical nurse specialists, which should make it easier for ACOs 
to form in rural areas where physicians are sometimes in short 
supply.
Unrealistic assumption of stable provider networks. CMS 
had proposed prohibiting ACOs from adding new provider 
organizations during their three-year contracts with Medicare, 
but would have allowed ACOs to add individual physicians 
working in already-included provider organizations. This would 
have favored organizations with employed physicians, such 
as hospitals and large multispecialty group practices, while 
constraining associations of separate physician practices such 
as IPAs.
CMS will now allow both provider organizations and individual 
clinicians to be added or removed at any time during an ACO’s 
Medicare contract, as long as they notify CMS.
Requires ambitious adoption of EHRs. CMS had proposed 
requiring 50 percent of an ACO’s primary care physicians to be 
meaningful users of electronic health records by the start of the 
second year of their Medicare ACO contract—a high bar, when 
only 10 percent of office-based physicians currently use such 
advanced software.4 
CMS is no longer requiring this 50 percent threshold, but is 
basing bonus payments in part on the percentage of an ACO’s 
primary care physicians that are meaningful users of EHRs.
  1 Meyer, 2011.
  2 Sebelius, 2009. 
  3 Longworth DL. “Accountable Care Organizations, the Patient-centered Medical Home, and Health Care Reform: What Does It All Mean?” Cleveland Clinic 
    Journal of Medicine, 78(9): 571–582, 2011.
  4 Hsiao C, Hing E, Socey TC, et al. “Electronic Medical Record/Electronic Health Record Systems of Office-based Physicians: United States, 2009 and 
    Preliminary 2010 State Estimates.” U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, 2010, www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/
    emr_ehr_09/emr_ehr_09.pdf (accessed October 2011).
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stinting on care. Although the selected 
quality measures address some areas 
that have not been given sufficient 
attention in current volume-based 
payment systems, such as care coordi-
nation and care of at-risk populations, 
they do not cover the full range of 
areas that an organization responsible 
for the entire continuum of care for a 
population of Medicare beneficiaries 
should address; for example, appro-
priate referral to specialized centers 
outside the ACO, when specialized 
expertise is needed to treat particular 
forms of cancer.
As noted earlier, CMS will be requir-
ing ACOs to describe in their applica-
tions how they will ensure the delivery 
of evidence-based medicine, patient 
engagement in care, care coordination, 
and quality measurement. Monitoring 
whether ACOs actually engage in the 
activities they describe could be used 
to address quality issues not easily 
amenable to quality measurement. 
For example, if an ACO commits to 
producing referral guidelines that 
would inform clinicians of the specific 
conditions that are appropriate to refer 
to specialized centers of excellence, 
CMS could monitor the ACO to see 
whether the guidelines were generated 
and whether providers are using them. 
Will Patients Get to Choose 
Whether to Participate in an 
ACO? 
In the MSSP, beneficiaries will retain 
the freedom to seek care from any 
health care providers they choose. But 
if a beneficiary obtains the plurality 
of their primary care from a provider 
who belongs to an ACO, that ben-
eficiary’s total health care spending, 
along with care quality metrics, will be 
measured and used to assess whether 
their provider’s ACO is eligible for 
shared savings bonus payments. ACOs 
will be sent lists of beneficiaries they 
are likely to be held accountable for 
under CMS’ assignment algorithm on 
a quarterly basis. Then, at the end of 
the year, CMS will calculate ACOs’ 
shared savings bonus payments based 
on a re-assessment of where those ben-
eficiaries actually ended up receiving a 
plurality of their primary care services. 
CMS calls this approach “preliminary 
prospective assignment.” Beneficiaries 
cannot opt out of having their data 
used to measure the performance of 
their provider’s ACO, but they will 
have the opportunity to decline to 
allow their clinical information to be 
shared with the ACO to which they 
are likely to be assigned, for privacy 
reasons. 
For their part, private ACO contracts 
suggest that there is not yet a con-
sensus on the best way to attribute 
patients to an ACO. Some of Aetna’s 
ACO contracts use prospective patient 
attribution, and others use retrospec-
tive attribution. Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Illinois uses an approach 
that it calls “prospective based on 
retrospective utilization,” and Anthem 
/ WellPoint uses a similar hybrid ap-
proach. Meanwhile, Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Massachusetts uses prospec-
tive attribution, while Horizon Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey and 
Medica Health Plan in Minnesota both 
use retrospective attribution.36  Within 
a few years, health plans and provider 
organizations should have learned 
some useful lessons about the pros and 
cons of these different patient attribu-
tion approaches.
Will ACOs Address Health 
Disparities? 
Although ACOs will focus on im-
proving adherence to evidence-based 
medicine in order to improve provid-
ers’ performance on clinical quality 
measures, it is unclear whether this 
focus will ameliorate or exacerbate 
current health disparities among racial 
and socioeconomic subgroups. On the 
one hand, racial minorities may benefit 
from ACOs’ increased attention to 
ensuring that patients remain in good 
health, which could “raise all boats” 
and thus shrink the current dispari-
ties in the receipt of high-quality care 
among these subgroups.37   On the 
other hand, ACOs may end up form-
ing in areas that have more resources 
available to devote to the infrastruc-
ture investments necessary to get an 
ACO up and running—for example, in 
areas where a higher proportion of the 
population has private insurance and 
providers are therefore reimbursed at 
more generous reimbursement levels. 
This could lead to an inadvertent exac-
erbation of health disparities, if racial 
subgroups are left behind as other 
populations are targeted by ACOs. 
CMS’ Medicare ACO regulations in-
clude some provisions designed to en-
courage ACOs to form in areas likely 
to have fewer resources and lower-
income patients. For example, under 
the final regulations for the MSSP, fed-
erally qualified health centers (usually 
located in underserved areas), rural 
health centers, and critical access hos-
pitals (located in remote areas) are all 
allowed to form ACOs.38  The ultimate 
impact of these provisions, and ACOs 
more generally, on health disparities 
remains to be seen.
Will Provider Consolidation 
into ACOs Raise Prices for 
Private Insurers?
ACOs are designed to reduce fragmen-
tation and poor coordination between 
different providers, which could lead 
to lower health care utilization, but 
they could also produce higher prices 
as hospitals and physicians consolidate 
and become more powerful nego-
tiators.39  This could worsen existing 
problems: studies exploring why U.S. 
health care spending far exceeds that 
of other countries have already found 
that substantially higher prices—and 
not the overuse of services such as 
doctor visits and hospitalizations—is a 
leading cause of our higher spending.40 
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Because of the concern that newly 
formed ACOs could use their new-
found market power to demand and 
receive higher payment rates from 
private insurers, the U.S. Department 
of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) issued a proposed 
statement earlier this spring offering 
guidance about ACO configurations—
in terms of size and provider compo-
sition—that are safe from antitrust 
scrutiny, those that might be problem-
atic, and those that are unacceptable.41  
The proposed statement also called for 
a mandatory antitrust review for ACOs 
that met certain thresholds for provider 
concentration, i.e., if two or more pro-
viders participating in an ACO provide 
a common service to patients from the 
same Primary Service Area and have a 
combined market share of 50 percent 
or more.
The objective of these provisions is 
to permit ACO configurations that are 
large enough to truly become account-
able for the quality and cost of large 
populations, but not large enough to be 
able to demand and receive high prices 
from private health plans because of 
their market dominance. The ACO 
antitrust guidance provides protections 
against ACOs amassing market power 
by limiting an ACO’s permitted share 
of providers who would otherwise be 
competing in its market area.42 
Many would-be ACOs opposed man-
datory review of ACOs for various 
reasons, including the argument that it 
would be bad public policy to change 
the nature of antitrust enforcement 
from law enforcement to administra-
tion of a regulatory regime. In the 
final rule, CMS no longer will require 
receipt of a letter from a reviewing 
antitrust agency (i.e., DOJ or FTC) 
confirming that it has no present intent 
to challenge an ACO on antitrust 
grounds, but CMS still recommends 
that prospective ACOs seek a volun-
tary review by an antitrust agency. 
As suggested in comments submit-
ted to CMS, a different antitrust 
enforcement approach would focus 
on an ACO’s actions, not its size and 
configuration. One such performance 
metric that could be used is per capita 
costs for non-Medicare patients served 
by a Medicare ACO. If CMS measured 
ACOs against norms of private per 
capita health spending, raising prices 
for private insurers would be self-de-
feating for ACOs. Some private health 
plans are already collecting data on 
costs generated per patient as part of 
their private ACO contracts with pro-
viders, which suggests that reporting 
this data to CMS might not be admin-
istratively burdensome.43  Although 
it might seem a stretch for CMS to 
consider the ACO’s performance in 
caring for non-Medicare patients as 
a major determinant of its participa-
tion in a program specific to Medicare 
beneficiaries, CMS’ final rule notes 
that it has requested that the antitrust 
agencies conduct a study examining 
what impact ACOs participating in the 
MSSP have on the quality and price 
of health care in private markets. This 
leaves open the possibility that CMS 
could change the eligibility criteria for 
Medicare ACOs in the future to more 
explicitly consider impact on market 
competition, using such performance 
measures. 
How Fast Will ACOs 
Spread?
CMS estimates that the MSSP will 
generate net savings of up to $940 
million over its first four years, assum-
ing that 50 to 270 ACOs sign up to 
participate. According to the American 
Medical Group Association, more than 
100 of its member medical groups are 
well positioned to become ACOs,44  
and many other providers are likely 
to be interested in exploring the ACO 
concept. So far, the reception to CMS’ 
final regulations has been positive. 
But how many organizations actually 
apply to CMS to be ACOs is another 
question. 
It remains unsettled whether the pri-
mary purpose of the MSSP and com-
panion Pioneer ACO model should be 
to test the ACO concept to see if it is 
broadly scalable to diverse providers, 
whether or not it generates substan-
tial early savings to the government, 
or whether the goal of the program 
should be to move as many providers 
as possible into the program as soon 
as possible to satisfy political pres-
sures to slow the growth in Medicare 
spending.45  
In its final regulations, CMS seems 
to be adopting the former viewpoint. 
MedPAC has sided with this view; it 
has stated to CMS that “it would be 
a mistake to assess the success of the 
shared savings program by counting 
how many ACOs participate in the 
initial agreement period.”46 
In the view of Jay Crosson, former 
executive director of Kaiser Perman-
ente’s physician component, the ACO 
concept is “too vitally important to 
fail.” He argues that the likely alterna-
tive for providers if ACOs do not take 
root could be blunt, across-the-board 
cuts to payment rates.47  By the end of 
2012, we should know how success-
ful CMS’ program was in attracting 
provider interest in the ACO model 
in Medicare, and how extensively the 
private sector plans to experiment 
with this payment model. Within a 
few years after that, we should have 
a much stronger evidence base about 
how to improve quality and reduce 
costs using ACO-style payment ar-
rangements, given the experiments 
that Medicare and private sector 
providers and payers are currently 
embarking on.
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